The strategic interplay between counterterror measures and terror activity is complex. Herein, we propose a dynamic model to depict this interaction. The model generates stylized prognoses: (i) under conditions of inefficient counterterror measures, terror groups enjoy longer period of activity but only if recruitment into terror groups remains low; high recruitment shortens the period of terror activity (ii) highly efficient counterterror measures effectively contain terror activity, but only if recruitment remains low. Thus, highly efficient counterterror measures can effectively contain terrorism if recruitment remains restrained. We conclude that the trajectory of the dynamics between counterterror measures and terror activity is heavily altered by recruitment.
Introduction
Can highly efficient counterterror measures curb terrorism? Despite intensive counterterror efforts against terror networks, the threat from these networks remains significant and constantly mutating. 1 The strategic interplay between counterterror measures and terror activity is complex. Terrorism is a dynamic process, especially in the context of how it responds to counterterror measures. 2 Dynamic considerations may arise from the coevolution of terrorism and counterterrorism. A cursory look at offensive counterterror measures and the incidents of terrorism highlight this interaction. Figure 1 shows that drone attacks against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen hit its highest casualty in 2012. Accordingly, the incident of AQAP's terrorist activity peaked in both 2012 and 2015. 3 There was a drop in the incident of AQAP's activity in 2013; however, in 2015, AQAP increased its operation.
In counterterror planning, it is not only important to estimate the rise of terror activity or how such activity may respond to counterterror measures, but also to identify the key ingredient that sustains it. The main resource of any terror group is its militants, recruited from the pool of its supporters. 4 Brito and Intriligator identified recruitment as the primary variable in sustaining guerrilla warfare. 5 Whereas Brito and Intriligator concentrate on guerrilla warfare and its territorial properties, herein, we focus on the dynamic interplay between counterterror measures and terror activity. Can highly efficient counterterror measures contain terror activity at all levels of recruitment? We argue that extremely efficient counterterror measures can contain terror activity if recruitment remains low. This is because soaring recruitment can override the impact of highly efficient counterterror measures. 49 Crenshaw notes that recruitment is a necessity for terror group to survive over time. 6 Terror organizations heavily rely on non-structured recruitment to guide the committed into its fold for further training and indoctrination. 7 For example, Sageman states that Al Qaeda never entrusted much effort into a comprehensive recruitment drive, instead it relied heavily on non-structured recruitment to guide the committed. 8 Indeed, the non-structured recruitment is a critical element in the advancement of Global Jihad. 9 If restraining recruitment has a large impact on the success rate of counterterror measures, managing it should be prioritized.
This matters for key ongoing debate on efficient counterterror policies to curb terrorism efficaciously. We hypothesize that only under conditions of restrained recruitment highly efficient counterterror measures can effectively contain terrorism. This insight can help governments develop more effective strategies and to invest its valuable scarce resources in curtailing recruitment. Herein, we uncover a simple dynamic model that estimates the strategic interplay between counterterror measures and terror activity. The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief review of the literature; second, we introduce our baseline model and conduct computer simulations; third, we present our main findings; and finally we conclude. 
A Brief Review of Literature
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence in order to obtain a political objective. 11 Earlier terrorism research focused on the definition of terrorism, the myriad causes of terrorism, terror tactics, and the identity of terror organizations. 12 Rapoport first distinguished terrorism from other forms of political violence. 13 Thornton defined terrorism in the context of internal war and as "a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence." 14 Other experts focused on the evolution of terror groups as a type of social movement. 15 The literature on social movements posits terrorism may appear at the end of a cycle of the rise and fall of movements of mass protest. 16 Others note that local causes cannot explain global waves, and while ideology is a necessary ingredient, it does not explain it. 17 Long-term analysis of terrorism trends indicate that transnational terror attacks run in cycles with peaks approximately every two years. 18 Rapoport argues that over the course of modern history, characterized by expansion and contraction, waves of international terror activity last about a generation. 19 Rapoport notes that, since the late 19th century, terror attacks can be divided into four waves. 20 A wave is defined as a cycle of activity in a given time period with expansion and contraction phases. 21 Townshend suggests that the idea of waves of terrorism has the capacity to identify the evolution as well as the massing of terrorist events: the peaks and troughs of the waveforms echo the periods when terrorist action has intensified, peaked, and 51 eventually diminished. 22 However, a single explain-all solution for the complex problem of the transformation of terrorism remains open. 23 For example, Proshyn notes the activity of terror groups is not conducted in parallel with the dynamics of its waves. 24 Johnson et al. find a power-law like acceleration curves in the delay between events. 25 It is argued that this pattern is caused by a red queen effect, in which two sides of the conflict race through some abstract space, and the timing between events is given by how far ahead the insurgent is in the race. 26 Others suggest terror activities conform to a temporal pattern that can provide insight into terror attack frequencies. 27 Johnson et al. uncover a dynamical pattern that may be used to estimate the escalation rate and timing of fatal attacks. 28 They argue that the time difference between fatal attacks by insurgent groups within individual provinces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and by terrorist groups operating worldwide, gives a potent indicator of the later pace of lethal activity. Clauset and Gleditsch identify patterns in the frequency and severity of violent attacks by aging terror groups. 29 The authors' analyses of terror events worldwide from shows that the production of violent events tends to accelerate with increasing size.
Turning to the trends in the terrorist recruitment process, one aspect should be emphasized, that of top-down recruitment. 30 Absence of any top-down recruitment, joining the Jihad centers on impromptu formed clusters. 31 Mair argues that virtually any country in the world has some potential as a recruitment pool; however, any meaningful pool requires at least three elements:
1. spontaneously formed clusters has resulted in a profusion of loosely connected networks. 33 This pattern of unstructured growth has immense ramifications as the strength of weak ties makes counterterror efforts difficult since it is infeasible to rattle an organizational structure that does not exist. 34 The recruitment process is not an isolated phenomenon but is inherently linked to issues like marginalization and questions of identity. 35 Empirical analyses have shown that indiscriminate repressive actions result in more terror attacks, whereas indiscriminate conciliatory actions result in fewer attacks. 36 Sandler notes that proactive responses against a terror threat may unleash backlash if terrorist supporters view such actions as excessive, thereby resulting in new recruits. 37 When this occurs, the positive benefits from proactive actions are reduced by the backlash costs.
Few scholars have investigated counterterrorism effectiveness of retaliatory raids. 38 Enders and Sandler found an intertemporal substitution, where terrorists moved attacks planned for the future to the present to protest the raids. 39 Thus, terror attacks rose following raids and declined months later as terrorists had to replenish exhausted resources. 40 Lum et al. studied the evaluation research on counterterror interventions, and found that not only some interventions did not achieve the outcomes sought; at times they even increased the likelihood of terrorism occurring. 41 
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group and a government as they both vie for grassroots support. 42 They found that when terrorists and the government act contemporaneously, the equilibrium outcome depends on the effectiveness of the government's counter measures.
The Current Study
The specification of an accurate model including most relevant factors is a prerequisite for a useful model; the particular challenge is that it can be difficult to select the relevant factors for inclusion in a conceptual model, and to define the form of the relationships between all of the factors mathematically. 43 Most efforts in this direction have relied on models from the time series or survival analysis. 44 Herein, we employ mathematical analysis and System Dynamics simulations. Using these measures, we study how terror activity varies over time in reaction to counterterror measures. The simulation results yield new and interesting insights into the growth and stagnation of terror activity and the challenges it poses for counterterrorism agencies. In the following section, we present the model.
Model
Let N be the number of terror activities, and C the number of counterterror measures Our computer simulation is based on a modified adaptation of the Lotka-Voltera. 45 Specifically, we employ the predator-prey model. 46 The Lotka-Volterra model parameters specify a dynamic system. 47 This model is a fine baseline structure to probe the impact of interaction between terrorism and counterterrorism. 48 Tsebelis and Sprague adapted the predator-prey model to the problem of revolution and coercion in order to capture the dynamic characteristics of the interactions between the state and rebels. 49 We assume that terror organizations need recruits to conduct their activities; N can increase at a rate = over time.
In a study by Asal and Rethemeyer, the authors found that organizational characteristics such as size and alliance connections are important predictors of terror group lethality. 50 Here, we incorporate a term for alliances ( ), since alliances can support terror organizations' activities. We assume that counterterror measures confront terror activities at a rate( ), ℎ ∴ = − . Agencies can reduce counterterror measures at a rate ( ), where = − ; is the rate at which agencies reduce operations and denotes the level of counterterror spending. Herein, spending reflects both the depth and scope in the funding of counterterrorism programs in order to detect, prevent, deter, and reduce the risk of terror-related violence. inflates at rate when = ; denotes the rate at which counterterror measures efficiency expands. The result of these assumptions is a set of two coupled differential equations:
Results
We examine two distinct anti-terror policies: Inefficient and efficient. The modeler presents the emergent aggregate level behavior of terror activities and counterterror measures. The simulation results of the System Dynamics modeler draw the peaks and troughs of both counterterror and terror activities. 51 Several manipulations of the parameter values of the model are implemented in the simulations below.
Simulations
Inefficient Counterterror Measures (VIa).
We set the efficiency of counterterror measures ( ) and terrorist recruitment ( ) at some low value ( = 0.5, = 0.04). Terror ( ) and counterterror ′( ) curves intersect twice (see figure 2) . Next, we increase recruitment into terror groups by 164 percent while controlling for ( = 0.5, = 0.4). 52 Because recruitment into terror groups is high, the time it takes to reach point A is shorter (four time units) and the terror funnel is smaller than in VIa. However, terror activity is 174 percent higher than in VIa. This suggests that while terror enterprises enjoy a short terror funnel, these enterprises exhibit a high level of activity (figure 4). In this scenario, we increase the efficiency of counterterror measures by 75 percent while keeping recruitment level at a low value ( = 1.1, = 0.04). The simulation results show that the counterterror curve builds a tangent with the terror curve and thus, avoids the creation of a terror trap. Only here, terrorism is contained (figure 5). Thus, terror activities are effectively managed by the counterterror measures. Finally, we test the interplay between high recruitment and highly efficient counterterror measures ( = 1.1, = 0.4). We find that the time it takes to reach the counterterror trap (Point B) is short (14 time units); thus, a small terror funnel is created. Terror activity is 78 percent lower than VIb but higher than VIa and VIc. Under this condition, highly efficient counterterror measures can significantly reduce the time span of terror activity-even though recruitment into terror groups is still high (figure 6). 
Conclusion
The strategic interaction between counterterror measures and terror activity is complex. Our model depicts this dynamic interaction. We find that under conditions of inefficient counterterror measures, terror groups enjoy longer periods of activity. For this condition to hold, recruitment into terror groups must remain restrained. Inflated recruitment shortens the period of activity but boosts the number of such enterprises. Highly efficient counterterror measures can effectively contain terror activity, but only if recruitment remains restrained. Thus, recruitment profoundly alters the trajectory of the dynamics between counterterror measures and terror activity. We conclude that highly efficient counterterror measures can be remarkably successful, if recruitment into terror groups remains depressed.
The interplay between counterterror measures and terror activity may coevolve and can contribute to the fluctuations in growth and decline of terror enterprises. This coevolution happens over time in which each side employs adaptations in response to escalations. The force of counterterror measures may instigate selective pressures on recruitment that can influence the dynamics of their relationship. Population cycles can lead to fluctuating selection, so that the evolution of terrorism may occur indefinitely and can reciprocally influence counterterror dynamics. It is important to note that interactions governing ecological dynamics continually change through
